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Send Cart Email. Your cart email sent successfully :. Choose an option 11 oz Round 14 oz Round 9. Each window is allocated by a landlord principal instance or Browser Kernel; and each window is delegated to or rented to a tenant principal instance.

For example, when the web site a. The same kind of delegation happens when cross-origin object and image elements are embedded. Browser Kernel allocates top-level windows or tabs.

When the user launches a site through address-bar entry, Browser Kernel delegates the top-level window to the site, making the site a tenant.

Window creation and delegation result in a delegate URL, position, dimensions system call. For each window, Browser Kernel maintains the following state: its landlord, tenant, position, dimensions, pixels in the window, and the URL location of the window content.

Browser Kernel manages a three-dimensional. A landlord provides the stacking order of all its delegated windows to Browser Kernel.

Because a window is created by a landlord and occupied by a tenant, Browser Kernel must allow reasonable window interactions from both principal instances without losing protection.

Therefore, Browser Kernel enforces that only the landlord of a window can change the position and the dimensions of a window. Therefore, Browser Kernel enforces that only the tenant can draw within the window.

Nevertheless, a landlord can create overlapping windows delegated to different principal instances. Navigation is a fundamental element of any web application.

Therefore, both the landlord and the tenant are allowed to set the URL location of the window. The tenant can read the URL location as long as it remains being the tenant.

Table 1 summarizes the access control policies in Browser Kernel. In existing browsers, these manipulation policies also vaguely exist.

However, their logic is intermingled with the DOM logic and is implemented at the object property and method level of a number of DOM objects which all reside in the same protection domain despite their origins.

This had led to numerous vulnerabilities [17, 40]. In Gazelle, by separating these security policies from the DOM semantics and implementation, and concentrating them inside Browser Kernel, we achieve much more clarity in our policies and much stronger robustness in the system construction.

Browser Kernel ensures that principal instances other than the landlord and the tenant cannot manipulate any of the window states.

This includes manipulating the URL location for navigation. Descendant navigation policy allows a landlord to navigate a window created by its tenant even if the landlord and the tenant are different principals.

This is flawed in that a tenant-created window is a resource that belongs to the tenant and should not be controllable by a different principal.

Existing literature [7, 8] supports the descendant navigation policy with the following argument: since existing browsers allow the landlord to draw over the tenant, a landlord can simulate the descendant navigation by overdrawing.

Though overdrawing can visually simulate navigation, navigation is much more powerful than overdrawing because a landlord with such descendant navigation capability can interfere with 9.

Browser Kernel captures all events in the system and must accurately dispatch them to the right principal instance to achieve cross-principal event protection.

Networking and persistent-state events are easy to dispatch. However, user interface events pose interesting challenges to Browser Kernel in discerning event ownership, especially when dealing with overlapping, potentially transparent cross-origin windows: major browsers allow web pages to mix content from different origins along the z axis where content can be occluded, either partially or completely, by cross-origin content.

In addition, current standards allow web pages to make a frame or portions of their windows transparent, further blurring the lines between principals.

Although these flexible mechanisms have a slew of legitimate uses, they can be used to fool users into thinking they are interacting with content from one origin, but are in fact interacting with content from a different origin.

To achieve cross-principal events protection, Browser Kernel needs to determine the event owner, the principal instance to which the event is dispatched.

There are two types of events: stateless and stateful. The owner of a stateless event like a mouse event is the tenant of the window or display area on which the event takes place.

The owner of a stateful event such as a key-press event is the tenant of the current in-focus window. Browser Kernel interprets mouse clicks as focus-setting events and keeps track of the current in-focus window and its principal instance.

The key problem to solve then is to determine the window on which a stateless or focus-setting event takes place.

We consider a determination to have high fidelity if the determined event owner corresponds to the user intent. Different window layout policies directly affect the fidelity of this determination.

We explore various layout policies and settle on the policy that gives us the best fidelity, security, and backward compatibility.

The layout policy in existing browsers is to draw windows according to the DOM hierarchy and the z-index values of the windows.

Existing browsers then associate a stateless or focussetting event to the window that has the highest stacking order.

Today, most browsers permit page authors to set transparency on cross-origin windows [44]. For two overlapping, cross-origin windows, such mixing is often not mutually intended by page authors as well otherwise, they would be same-origin windows.

The ability to overlay transparent cross-origin content is also extremely dangerous: a malicious site can make an iframe sourced at a legitimate site tranparent and overlaid on top of the malicious site [44], fooling the users to interact with the legitimate site unintentionally.

The two layout policies below pose additional constraints on layout policies so that the user intent and event owners can be determined more reliably and securely, but they have different trade-offs between security and backward compatibility.

In this policy, the display is managed as two-dimensional space for the purpose of delegation. Once a landlord delegates a rectangular area to a tenant, the landlord cannot 4.

Thus, no cross-principal content can be overlaid. Such a layout constraint will enable perfect fidelity in determining an event ownership that corresponds to the user intent.

It also yields better security as it can prevent all UI redressing attacks except clickjacking [44]. Even clickjacking would be extremely difficult to launch with this policy on our system since our cross-principal memory protection makes reading and writing the scrolling state of a window an exclusive right of the tenant of the window.

However, this policy can have a significant impact on backward compatibility. For example, a menu from a host page cannot be drawn over a nested cross-origin frame or object; many sites would have significant constraints with their own DOM-based pop-up windows created with divs and such rather than using window.

We allow same-origin windows to transparently overlay with one another. We also allow a page to use a cross-origin image which are static content as its background.

Note that no principal instance other than the tenant of the window can set the background of a window due to our memory protection across principal instances.

Browser Kernel associates a stateless event or a focus-setting event with the dynamic content-containing window that has the highest stacking order.

This policy prevents an attack page from overlaying a transparent victim page over itself. However, by allowing overlapping opaque cross-origin frames or objects, our policy allows not only legitimate uses, such as those denied by the 2D display delegation policy, but it also allows an attacker page to cover up and expose selective areas of a nested cross-origin victim frame or object.

This policy can result in infidelity for the latter scenario. We are exploring such a mitigation strategy and a heuristic that yields no or extremely low false positives as well as low false negatives.

One additional consideration is race condition attacks [44]. In such an attack, a malicious page may predict a user click based on earlier user behaviors and then exposes a screen area just before the click takes place, making the user unintentionally click on the newly exposed screen area.

The 2D display delegation policy above eliminates this attack because of no overlapping of cross-origin windows at all. With the opaque transparency policy, we mitigate this category of attacks as follows: Browser Kernel keeps track of newly exposed screen areas caused by window creation, repositioning or resizing.

It ignores any click events at the newly exposed screen area until the user has had enough time 1 second to see the area. This solution will mitigate scenarios where users click on a legitimate site shown by an attacker site unintentionally.

It is not meant to prevent picture-in-picture attacks where users are fooled and consciously click on attacker sites. We chose the opaque overlay policy together with the above mitigation mechanism as our design because it presents the best tradeoff for fidelity, security, and backward compatibility.

Nevertheless, this design offers significantly better backward compatibility than the 2D display delegation policy. If Browser Kernel is compromised, the entire browser is compromised.

If the underlying OS is compromised, the entire host system is compromised. When Browser Kernel, DNS, and the OS are intact, our architecture guarantees that the compromise of a principal instance does not give it any capabilities additional to those already granted to it through Browser Kernel system call interface Section 4.

We also make a comparison with popular browsers with a study on their past, known vulnerabilities. The only logic for which we need to ensure correctness is the origin determination in Browser Kernel.

This is unlike existing browsers, where origin validations and SOP enforcement are spread through the browser code base [9] and content from different principals co-exist in shared memory.

All of the cross-origin vulnerabilities illustrated in Chen et al. Cross-origin script source can still be leaked in our architecture if a site can compromise its browser instance.

Cross-principal display and events protection and access control are enforced in Browser Kernel.

This prevents a potentially compromised principal from hijacking the display and events that belong to another principal. These attacks manifest in existing browsers when an attacker places a decoy user interface underneath malicious UI components with transparent CSS settings.

Gazelle prevents these attacks by ignoring user input into newly exposed window area for one second until the user has got a chance to see the newly exposed display.

In contrast, in existing browsers, a compromised plugin undermines the entire browser and often the host system as well. A DNS rebinding attack results in the browser labeling resources from different network hosts with a common origin.

This allows an attacker to operate within SOP and access unauthorized resources [26]. Table 2: Vulnerability Study for IE 7 and Firefox 2 Although Gazelle does not fundamentally address this vulnerability, the fact that plugins must interact with the network through Browser Kernel system calls defeats the multipin form of such attacks.

We analyzed the known vulnerabilities of two major browsers, Firefox 2 [3] and IE 7 [31] since their release to November , as shown in Table 2.

For both browsers, memory errors are a significant source of errors. Memory-related vulnerabilities are often exploited by maliciously crafted web pages to compromise the entire browser and often the host machines.

In Gazelle, although Browser Kernel is implemented with managed C code, it uses native. NET libraries, such as network and display libraries; memory errors in those libraries could still cause memory-based attacks against Browser Kernel.

Memory attacks in principal instances are well-contained in their respective sandboxed processes. Cross-origin vulnerabilities, or origin validation errors represent a significant portion of total vulnerabilities.

These vulnerabilities result from the implicit sharing across principals in existing browsers and can be much more easily eliminated in our browser because cross-principal protection is exclusively handled by Browser Kernel and the use of sandboxed process.

In IE 7, there are 3 GUI logic flaws which can be exploited to spoof the contents of the address bar.

We anticipate that it will be much easier to apply code contracts [6] in Browser Kernel than in a monolithic browser to eliminate many of such vulnerabilities.

Since Gazelle enforces security properties in Browser Kernel, any errors that manifest as the result of JavaScript handling and parsing are limited in the scope of exploit to the principal instance owning the page.

URL handling errors could occur in our Browser Kernel as well. We have built a Gazelle prototype as described in Section 4, running on Windows Vista with.

NET framework 3. We next discuss the implementation of two major components shown in Figure 2: Browser Kernel the browser instance.

Browser Kernel. Browser Kernel consists of approximately 5k lines of C code. It communicates with principal instances using system calls and upcalls, which are implemented as asynchronous XML-based messages sent over named pipes.

An overview of Browser Kernel system calls and upcalls are listed in Table 3. Syscalls are performed by the browser instance or plugins and sometimes include replies.

Upcalls are messages from Browser Kernel to the browser instance. Display management is implemented as described in Section 5 using.

Each browser instance provides Browser Kernel with a bitmap for each window of its rendered content using a display system call; each change in rendered content results in a subsequent display call.

This straightforward display implementation has numerous optimization opportunities, Type syscall syscall syscall syscall syscall syscall syscall syscall syscall syscall syscall syscall syscall upcall upcall upcall upcall upcall.

Description retrieves same origin content retrieves script or css content delegates screen area to a different principal cross-frame messaging sets the display buffer for the window steps back in the window history steps forward in the window history navigates a window to URL creates a new browser tab for the URL specified updates the location and size of a window allows writing to origin partitioned storage allows reading of origin partitioned storage locks one type of origin partitioned storage closes a browser instance changes the dimensions of the browser instance creates a plugin instance creates a browser instance passes an event to the browser instance.

Table 3: The Gazelle System Calls many of which have been thoroughly studied [29, 34, 36], and which are not the focus of our work.

Browser instance. Instead of undertaking a significant effort of writing our own HTML parser, renderer, and JavaScript engine, we borrow these components from Internet Explorer 7 in a way that does not compromise security.

For example, suppose a user navigates to a web page a. First, Browser Kernel will fetch a. During the rendering process, we intercept the frame navigation event for b.

Browser Kernel then creates a new b. For any rendered display updates for either a. Browser startup no page 2. New tab blank page 3. New tab google.

Navigate from google. Navigate to nytimes. Table 4: Loading times and memory overhead for a sequence of typical browser operations.

Our interposition layer ensures that our Trident components are never trusted with sensitive operations, such as network access or display rendering.

To prevent this, we are in the process of implementing an OS-level sandboxing mechanism, which would prevent Trident from directly accessing sensitive OS APIs.

The feasibility of such a browser sandbox has already been established in Xax [14]; our sandboxing mechanism is a strict engineering effort that builds on this work.

To verify that such an implementation does not cause rendering problems with popular web content, we used our prototype to manually browse through the top 20 Alexa [5] web sites.

We found that 19 of 20 web sites rendered correctly. The remaining web site exposed a fixable bug in our interposition code, which caused it to load with incorrect layout.

This illustrates a desirable security property of our architecture, which prevents malicious or misbehaving cross-origin tenants from affecting their landlords or other principals.

In this section, we evaluate the performance of the Gazelle prototype and the compatibility of Gazelle with a preliminary quantative study of popular web sites.

We measure the impact of our architecture on browser performance. All tests were performed on an Intel 2. We found that while Gazelle performs on-par with desktop browsers while browsing within an origin, it introduces some overhead for cross-origin navigation, e.

The overhead mainly stems from our Trident interposition layer, various initialization costs for new browser instances, and the unoptimized nature of our prototype.

We point out simple optimizations that would mitigate much of the overhead along the way. Page load latency. Table 4 shows the loading times for a series of browser operations a typical user might perform, using both our prototype and standalone Internet Explorer 7 which has a monolithic process Latency google.

Table 5: A breakdown of overheads for page rendering times. Note that nytimes. The operations are repeated one after another within the same browser.

All operations include network latency. Operations 2 and 3 each cause a new process to be created in Gazelle; compared to IE7, these operations incur additional process creation costs.

Operation 4 reuses the same google. Finally, operation 5 causes Gazelle to create a new process for nytimes. It is expected that for most operations Gazelle will have a performance overhead as compared to standalone IE, due to process creation costs, messaging overhead, and the overhead of our Trident interposition layer as well as Trident itself.

To better understand the overheads involved, Table 5 breaks down the total page loading times for the three sites of Table 4 across various code paths in the BK and browser instance processes.

Our Trident interposition layer is a big source of overhead, especially for larger sites like NYTimes. Nevertheless, we believe we could mitigage most of this latency if Trident were to provide us with a direct non-COM implementation for a small subset of its hooks that Gazelle requires.

As well, each process must instantiate and initialize a new Trident object, which is expensive. As an optimization, we could use a worker pool of a few processes that have been pre-initialized with Trident.

In the case of a usertyped URL, the BK could predict such a call and start pre-fetching the URL while the browser instance processes are being initialized, effectively masking much of network latency.

Moreover, the BK currently releases web page data only when the network transfer finishes; instead, the BK could provide browser instances with chunks of data as soon as they arrive e.

This could be caused by initialization of an Interop layer between. NET and the native Win32 pipe interfaces, on which our implementation relies.

We can avoid this overhead by either using an alternate implementation of a system call transfer mechanism, or pre-initializing named pipes in our worker pool.

Retrieving bitmap display updates from Trident and sending them to BK is expensive for large, complex sites such as NYTimes. Numerous optimizations are possible, including image compression, VNC-like selective transfers, and a more efficient bitmap sharing channel between Trident and BK.

Our mechanism for transferring bitmap updates currently performs an inefficient. Memory overhead. As a baseline measurement, Browser Kernel occupies around 9MB of memory after a page load.

This includes the user interface components of the browser to present the rendered page to the user and the buffers allocated for displaying the rendered page.

Memory measurements do not include shared libraries used by multiple processes. Table 4 shows the amount of memory for performing various browsing operations.

For example, to open a new tab to a blank page, Gazelle consumes 14MB, and to open a new tab for google. Each empty browser instance uses 1.

In the case of NYTimes, our memory footprint further increases because of structures allocated by the interposition layer, such as a local DOM cache.

We evaluated the response time of a user-generated event, such as a mouse click. Such calls take only 2 ms on average to transfer, plus 1 ms to synthesize in Trident.

User actions might lead to display updates; for example, a display update for google. Most users should not perceive this overhead and will experience good responsiveness.

Process creation. In addition to latency and memory measurements we also have tested our prototype on the top popular sites reported by Alexa [5] to provide an estimate of the number of processes created for different sites.

The number of processes created is determined by the use of different-origin content on sites, which is most commonly image content. For the top sites, the median number of processes required to view a single page is 4, the minimum is 1, and the maximum is 28 caused by skyrock.

Although creation of many processes introduces additional latency and memory footprint, we did not experience difficulties when Gazelle created many processes during normal browsing.

Our test machine easily handles a hundred running processes, which are enough to keep 25 average web sites open simultaneously.

In this section, we give a preliminary compatibility study on Gazelle over the most popular web sites ranked by Alexa [5]. We use an instrumented browser to fetch content and execute JavaScript automatically.

For our quantitative comparisons, we consider any visual differences in the rendering of a web page to be violation of compatibility.

This conservative metric helps to give us an upper bound on the number of sites from the top that are incompatible with Gazelle.

Gazelle enforces the same-origin policy on plugin content. That is, plugin content runs as the principal of its origin and not as the principal of its host page.

Since plugins are a source of rampant vulnerability growth, enforcing policy on plugins in Browser Kernel is critical for containing the damage caused by an exploit.

Existing plugin software must be adapted ported or binary-rewritten to use Browser Kernel system calls to accomplish its tasks.

There are 34 out of top Alexa sites that use Flash plugins and no other kinds of plugins are used. This indicates that by porting or adapting Flash alone can address a significant portion of the plugin compatibility issue.

Gazelle prohibits modification of document. Most current browsers allow document. Our experiments indicate that six of the top Alexa sites set document.

Although we currently prevent this behavior in Gazelle and favor postMessage for cross-window communication, Gazelle could utilize a migration strategy to change the principal for a page by moving the page from one principal to another.

Other types of content, such as images and plugins, will be run in the process belonging to the hosting principal. Strict child-only navigation.

A landlord frame can only cause navigation in tenants and has no control over frames belonging to the tenants or other principals.

Sites that attempt to navigate descendants other than direct children will be unable to do so in Gazelle. By limiting the scope of navigation, Gazelle is able to prevent malicious web pages from navigating frames in benign web applications.

This type of attack was previously analyzed by Barth et al. We were unable to automatically test sites for violations of this policy with our compatibility testing framework.

Layering of different-origin content. We test this policy with the top Alexa sites by determining if any cross-origin frames or objects are overlapped with one another.

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You, or anyone with the link, can use it to retrieve your Cart at any time. The processes are sandboxed so that they cannot interact with the underlying system and must use system calls provided by Browser Kernel.

Unlike all existing browsers except OP, our Browser Kernel offers the same protection to plugin content as to standard web content.

Such a multi-principal OS construction for a browser brings significant security and reliability benefits to the overall browser system: the compromise or failure of a principal affects that principal alone, and not other principals or Browser Kernel.

We detail our solutions to the first two problems and leave resource allocation as future work. In our browser design, we take the general stance that security maintaining the multi-principal OS principles by having Browser Kernel exclusively manage the resource protection and sharing comes before backward compatibility.

We will not trade significant security risks for compatibility. Nevertheless, we will also not settle on a design that breaks many parts of the web to secure just a few sites.

We present design rationales for such decisions throughout our design. Our prototype experience indicates that it is feasible to turn an existing browser into a multi-principal OS while leveraging its existing capabilities.

With our prototype, we successfully browsed 19 out of the 20 Alexa-reported [5], most popular sites that we tested.

The performance of the prototype is acceptable, and a significant portion of the overhead comes from IE instrumentation, which can be eliminated in a production implementation.

We gave a preliminary evaluation on backward compatibility of the policy enforced by Gazelle for the Alexa-reported, most popular sites. For the rest of the paper, we first give an in-depth comparison with related browser architectures in Section 2.

In Section 4, we present our architecture, its design rationale, and how we treat the subtle issue of legacy protection for cross-origin script source.

In Section 5, we elaborate on our problem statement and design for cross-principal, cross-process display protection.

We give a security analysis including a vulnerability study in Section 6. We describe our implementation in Section 7.

We detail our evaluation methodology and results in Section 8. Finally, we conclude and address future work in Section 9.

In this section, we discuss related browser architectures and compare them with Gazelle. In concurrent work [33], Reis et al detailed the various process models supported by Google Chrome: 1 monolithic process, 2 process-per-browsing-instance, 3 process-per-site-instance, and 4 process-per-site.

A browsing instance contains all interconnected or inter-referenced windows including tabs, frames and subframes despite their origin.

A site instance is a group of same-site pages within a browsing instance. A site is defined as a set of origins, as defined by SOP, that share a registry-controlled domain name, that is, attackerAd.

Google Chrome uses the process-per-site-instance model by default. We argue in Section 3 that this practice has significant security risks.

Pursuing this design led us to new research challenges including cross-principal, cross-process display protection Section 5. These differences indicate that in Chrome, cross-principal or -site protection takes place in its rendering processes and its plugin process, in addition to its Browser Kernel.

The OP web browser [20] uses processes to isolate browser components i. OP allows any security model to be specified with such a framework.

However, this flexibility comes with cost — intimate interactions between browser components, such as JavaScript interpreter and HTML engine, must use IPC and go through its browser kernel.

When targeting a specific security model, such as that of existing browsers or Gazelle, the additional IPC cost does not add any benefits: isolating browser components within an instance of a web page provides no additional security protection.

IE 8 [23] uses OS processes to isolate tabs from one another. This granularity is insufficient since a user may browse multiple mutually distrusting sites in a single tab and a web page may contain an iframe with content from an untrusted site e.

Tahoma [10] uses virtual machines to completely isolate its own definition of web applications, disallowing any communications between the VMs.

A web application is specified in a manifest file provided to the virtual machine manager and typically contains a suite of web sites of possibly different domains.

These inconsistencies present significant hurdles for web programmers to build robust web services. In this section, we give a brief background on the relevant security policies in existing browsers.

A script executes as the principal of its enclosing page though its source code is not readable in a cross-origin fashion. Cookies have a different security policy from that of script.

For cookie access, the principal is defined to be the URL including the path, but without the protocol [18, 28].

For example, if the page a. The browser ensures that a site can only set its own cookie and that a cookie is attached only to HTTP requests to that site.

Current major browsers cannot enforce any security on plugins because plugins are allowed to interact with the local operating system directly.

The plugin content is subject to the security policies implemented in the plugin software rather than the browser.

Unified SOP across all resources. Any sharing between two different principals must be explicit using cross-principal communication or IPC mediated by Browser Kernel.

While it is tempting to have a more fine-grained principal, such as a path-based principal, we need to be concerned with co-existing with current browsers [39] [25]: The protection boundary of a more fine-grained principal, such as a path-based principal would break down in existing browsers.

It is unlikely that web programmers would write very different versions of the same service to accommodate different browsers; instead, they would forego the more fine-grained principal and have a single code base.

The resources that need to be protected across principals [39] are memory such as the DOM objects and script objects, persistent state such as cookies, display, and network communications.

With a principaldriven approach, we have a consistent security policy across all these resources. This is unlike current browsers where the security policies vary for different resources.

For example, cookie uses a different principal than that of DOM objects see the above section ; descendant navigation policy [7] [8] also cross the SOP principal boundary implicitly more in Section 5.

We support some backward compatibility when there are no perceived security risks, such as certain cross-principal cookie accesses more later , through the explicit use of cross-principal communications.

This means that we enforce SOP on plugin content3. This is dangerous because a network attacker can then compromise the HTTP-transmitted script and attack the HTTPS principal despite its intent of preventing network attackers.

Subdomain treatment. Existing browsers and SOP make exceptions for subdomains e. This feature was one of the few methods for cross-origin frames to communicate before the advent of postMessage [23].

Changing document. This is also observed by Zalewski [44]. Nevertheless, we do need to be concerned of backward compatibility when it comes to cookie access.

We support this through the use of cross-principal communications. Figure 1 shows our basic architecture. Different principals are placed into separate protection domains so that they are protected from one another.

Just as in desktop applications where instances of an application are run in separate processes for failure containment, we run instances of principals in separate protection domains for the same purpose.

For example, when the user browses the same URL from different tabs, it corresponds to two instances of the same principal; when a.

In contrast, we consider them as separate principals. In contrast, we put them into separate principal instances. Browser Kernel runs in a separate protection domain and interposes between browser principals and the traditional OS and mediates their access to system resources.

Essentially, Browser Kernel functions as an operating system to browser principals and manages the protection and sharing of system resources for them.

Browser Kernel also manages the browser chrome, such as the address bar and menus. Browser Kernel receives all events generated by the underlying operating system including user events like mouse clicks or keyboard entries; then these events are dispatched to the appropriate principal instance.

Browser Kernel is agnostic of DOM and content semantics and has a relatively simple logic. Principals can communicate with one another using message passing through Browser Kernel, in the same fashion as inter-process communications IPC.

It is necessary that the protection domain of a principal instance is a restricted or sandboxed OS process. The use of process guarantees the isolation of principals even in the face of attacks that exploit memory vulnerabilities.

The process must be further restricted so that any interaction with system resources is limited to Browser Kernel system calls.

Xax [14] has established the feasibility of such process sandboxing. This architecture can be efficient.

By putting all browser components including plugins into one process, they can interact with one another through DOM intimately and efficiently as they do in existing browsers.

Unlike all existing browsers except OP, this architecture can enforce browser security policies on plugins, namely, plugin content from different origins are segregated into different processes.

Any plugin installed is unable to interact with the operating system and is only provided access to system resources subject to Browser Kernel allowing that access.

In this architecture, the payload that exploits plugin vulnerabilities will only compromise the principal with the same origin as the malicious plugin content, but not any other principals nor Browser Kernel.

Browser Kernel supports the following system calls related to content fetching in this architecture a. The semantics of these system calls is that Browser Kernel may return cross-origin script or style content to a principal based on the content-type header of the HTTP response, but returns other content if and only if the content has the same origin as the issuing principal, abiding the same-origin policy.

All the security decisions are made and enforced by Browser Kernel alone. The system call semantics in the basic architecture has one subtle issue: cross-origin script or style sheet sources are readable by the issuing principal, which does not conform with the existing SOP.

The SOP dictates that a script can be executed in a cross-origin fashion, but the access to its source code is restricted to same-origin only.

To answer this question, we must examine the primary intent of the script element abstraction. Script is primarily a library abstraction which is a necessary and useful abstraction for web programmers to include in their sites and run with the privilege of the includer sites [39].

This is in contrast with the frame abstractions: Programmers put content into cross-origin frames so that the content runs as the principal of its own provider and be protected from other principals.

Therefore, a script should be handled by the protection domain of its includer. In fact, it is a flaw of the existing SOP to offer protection for cross-origin script source.

Evidences have shown that it is extremely dangerous to hide sensitive data inside a script [21]. Numerous browser vulnerabilities exist for failing to provide the protection.

Unfortunately, web sites that rely on cross-origin script source protection, exist today. Web sites often demand such data to be same-origin access only.

In the light of the existing use, we modify our architecture slightly, as shown in Figure 2, to offer additional protection to cross-origin script source though we do anticipate web programmers will move away from the dangerous practice of putting sensitive data in scripts.

Third-party plugin software vulnerabilities have surged recently [32]. Symantec reports that in alone there are plugin vulnerabilities [38], which is about one magnitude higher than that of browser software.

Clearly, plugin software should be trusted much less than browser software. Therefore, for protecting cross-origin script or style sheet source, we place more trust in the browser code and let browser code retrieve and protect cross-origin script or style sheet sources: For each principal, we run browser code and plugin code in two separate processes as shown in Figure 2.

The plugin instance process cannot issue 7. In this architecture, the quality of protecting cross-origin script and style-sheet source relies on the browser code quality.

While this protection is not perfect with native browser code implementation, the architecture offers the same protection as OP, and stronger protection than the rest of existing browsers.

The separation of browser code and plugin code into separate processes also improves reliability by containing plugin failures. Their plugin model works perfectly in our browser architecture.

Cross-principal service composition is a salient nature of the web and is commonly used in web applications. When building a browser as a multi-principal OS, this composition raises new challenges in display sharing and event dispatching: when a web site embeds a cross-origin frame or objects, images , the involved principal instances share the display at the same time.

Therefore, it is important that Browser Kernel 1 discerns display and events ownership, 2 enforces that a principal instance can only draw in its own display areas, 3 dispatches UI events to only the principal instance with which the user is interacting.

An additional challenge is that Browser Kernel must accomplish these without access to any DOM semantics.

From a high level, in Gazelle we allow principal instances to render content into bitmap objects, and our Browser Kernel manages these bitmap objects and chooses when and where to display them.

Our architecture provides a clean separation between the act of rendering web content and the policies of how to display this content. Our display management fundamentally differs from that of the traditional multi-user OSes, such as Unix and Windows.

Traditional OSes offer no cross-principal display protection. In X, all the users who are authorized through. We define window to be a unit of display allocation and delegation.

Each window is allocated by a landlord principal instance or Browser Kernel; and each window is delegated to or rented to a tenant principal instance.

For example, when the web site a. The same kind of delegation happens when cross-origin object and image elements are embedded.

Browser Kernel allocates top-level windows or tabs. When the user launches a site through address-bar entry, Browser Kernel delegates the top-level window to the site, making the site a tenant.

Window creation and delegation result in a delegate URL, position, dimensions system call. For each window, Browser Kernel maintains the following state: its landlord, tenant, position, dimensions, pixels in the window, and the URL location of the window content.

Browser Kernel manages a three-dimensional. A landlord provides the stacking order of all its delegated windows to Browser Kernel. Because a window is created by a landlord and occupied by a tenant, Browser Kernel must allow reasonable window interactions from both principal instances without losing protection.

Therefore, Browser Kernel enforces that only the landlord of a window can change the position and the dimensions of a window.

Therefore, Browser Kernel enforces that only the tenant can draw within the window. Nevertheless, a landlord can create overlapping windows delegated to different principal instances.

Navigation is a fundamental element of any web application. Therefore, both the landlord and the tenant are allowed to set the URL location of the window.

The tenant can read the URL location as long as it remains being the tenant. Table 1 summarizes the access control policies in Browser Kernel.

In existing browsers, these manipulation policies also vaguely exist. However, their logic is intermingled with the DOM logic and is implemented at the object property and method level of a number of DOM objects which all reside in the same protection domain despite their origins.

This had led to numerous vulnerabilities [17, 40]. In Gazelle, by separating these security policies from the DOM semantics and implementation, and concentrating them inside Browser Kernel, we achieve much more clarity in our policies and much stronger robustness in the system construction.

Browser Kernel ensures that principal instances other than the landlord and the tenant cannot manipulate any of the window states.

This includes manipulating the URL location for navigation. Descendant navigation policy allows a landlord to navigate a window created by its tenant even if the landlord and the tenant are different principals.

This is flawed in that a tenant-created window is a resource that belongs to the tenant and should not be controllable by a different principal.

Existing literature [7, 8] supports the descendant navigation policy with the following argument: since existing browsers allow the landlord to draw over the tenant, a landlord can simulate the descendant navigation by overdrawing.

Though overdrawing can visually simulate navigation, navigation is much more powerful than overdrawing because a landlord with such descendant navigation capability can interfere with 9.

Browser Kernel captures all events in the system and must accurately dispatch them to the right principal instance to achieve cross-principal event protection.

Networking and persistent-state events are easy to dispatch. However, user interface events pose interesting challenges to Browser Kernel in discerning event ownership, especially when dealing with overlapping, potentially transparent cross-origin windows: major browsers allow web pages to mix content from different origins along the z axis where content can be occluded, either partially or completely, by cross-origin content.

In addition, current standards allow web pages to make a frame or portions of their windows transparent, further blurring the lines between principals.

Although these flexible mechanisms have a slew of legitimate uses, they can be used to fool users into thinking they are interacting with content from one origin, but are in fact interacting with content from a different origin.

To achieve cross-principal events protection, Browser Kernel needs to determine the event owner, the principal instance to which the event is dispatched.

There are two types of events: stateless and stateful. The owner of a stateless event like a mouse event is the tenant of the window or display area on which the event takes place.

The owner of a stateful event such as a key-press event is the tenant of the current in-focus window.

Browser Kernel interprets mouse clicks as focus-setting events and keeps track of the current in-focus window and its principal instance. The key problem to solve then is to determine the window on which a stateless or focus-setting event takes place.

We consider a determination to have high fidelity if the determined event owner corresponds to the user intent. Different window layout policies directly affect the fidelity of this determination.

We explore various layout policies and settle on the policy that gives us the best fidelity, security, and backward compatibility. The layout policy in existing browsers is to draw windows according to the DOM hierarchy and the z-index values of the windows.

Existing browsers then associate a stateless or focussetting event to the window that has the highest stacking order. Today, most browsers permit page authors to set transparency on cross-origin windows [44].

For two overlapping, cross-origin windows, such mixing is often not mutually intended by page authors as well otherwise, they would be same-origin windows.

The ability to overlay transparent cross-origin content is also extremely dangerous: a malicious site can make an iframe sourced at a legitimate site tranparent and overlaid on top of the malicious site [44], fooling the users to interact with the legitimate site unintentionally.

The two layout policies below pose additional constraints on layout policies so that the user intent and event owners can be determined more reliably and securely, but they have different trade-offs between security and backward compatibility.

In this policy, the display is managed as two-dimensional space for the purpose of delegation. Once a landlord delegates a rectangular area to a tenant, the landlord cannot 4.

Thus, no cross-principal content can be overlaid. Such a layout constraint will enable perfect fidelity in determining an event ownership that corresponds to the user intent.

It also yields better security as it can prevent all UI redressing attacks except clickjacking [44]. Even clickjacking would be extremely difficult to launch with this policy on our system since our cross-principal memory protection makes reading and writing the scrolling state of a window an exclusive right of the tenant of the window.

However, this policy can have a significant impact on backward compatibility. For example, a menu from a host page cannot be drawn over a nested cross-origin frame or object; many sites would have significant constraints with their own DOM-based pop-up windows created with divs and such rather than using window.

We allow same-origin windows to transparently overlay with one another. We also allow a page to use a cross-origin image which are static content as its background.

Note that no principal instance other than the tenant of the window can set the background of a window due to our memory protection across principal instances.

Browser Kernel associates a stateless event or a focus-setting event with the dynamic content-containing window that has the highest stacking order.

This policy prevents an attack page from overlaying a transparent victim page over itself. However, by allowing overlapping opaque cross-origin frames or objects, our policy allows not only legitimate uses, such as those denied by the 2D display delegation policy, but it also allows an attacker page to cover up and expose selective areas of a nested cross-origin victim frame or object.

This policy can result in infidelity for the latter scenario. We are exploring such a mitigation strategy and a heuristic that yields no or extremely low false positives as well as low false negatives.

One additional consideration is race condition attacks [44]. In such an attack, a malicious page may predict a user click based on earlier user behaviors and then exposes a screen area just before the click takes place, making the user unintentionally click on the newly exposed screen area.

The 2D display delegation policy above eliminates this attack because of no overlapping of cross-origin windows at all.

With the opaque transparency policy, we mitigate this category of attacks as follows: Browser Kernel keeps track of newly exposed screen areas caused by window creation, repositioning or resizing.

It ignores any click events at the newly exposed screen area until the user has had enough time 1 second to see the area. This solution will mitigate scenarios where users click on a legitimate site shown by an attacker site unintentionally.

It is not meant to prevent picture-in-picture attacks where users are fooled and consciously click on attacker sites.

We chose the opaque overlay policy together with the above mitigation mechanism as our design because it presents the best tradeoff for fidelity, security, and backward compatibility.

Nevertheless, this design offers significantly better backward compatibility than the 2D display delegation policy. If Browser Kernel is compromised, the entire browser is compromised.

If the underlying OS is compromised, the entire host system is compromised. When Browser Kernel, DNS, and the OS are intact, our architecture guarantees that the compromise of a principal instance does not give it any capabilities additional to those already granted to it through Browser Kernel system call interface Section 4.

We also make a comparison with popular browsers with a study on their past, known vulnerabilities. The only logic for which we need to ensure correctness is the origin determination in Browser Kernel.

This is unlike existing browsers, where origin validations and SOP enforcement are spread through the browser code base [9] and content from different principals co-exist in shared memory.

All of the cross-origin vulnerabilities illustrated in Chen et al. Cross-origin script source can still be leaked in our architecture if a site can compromise its browser instance.

Cross-principal display and events protection and access control are enforced in Browser Kernel. This prevents a potentially compromised principal from hijacking the display and events that belong to another principal.

These attacks manifest in existing browsers when an attacker places a decoy user interface underneath malicious UI components with transparent CSS settings.

Gazelle prevents these attacks by ignoring user input into newly exposed window area for one second until the user has got a chance to see the newly exposed display.

In contrast, in existing browsers, a compromised plugin undermines the entire browser and often the host system as well. A DNS rebinding attack results in the browser labeling resources from different network hosts with a common origin.

This allows an attacker to operate within SOP and access unauthorized resources [26]. Table 2: Vulnerability Study for IE 7 and Firefox 2 Although Gazelle does not fundamentally address this vulnerability, the fact that plugins must interact with the network through Browser Kernel system calls defeats the multipin form of such attacks.

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